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PROTECTING THE "RIGHT" TO CHOOSE





In Florida, two women with severe mental retardation' were raped
and impregnated in separate group homes supervised by the Depart-
ment of Children and Families (DCF).2 In the Miami case, the woman
has the mental capacity of a four-year-old and communicated, "My
baby no more.",3 Family members advocated an abortion, and her neu-
rologist viewed the pregnancy as life-threatening.4 A judge subse-
quently ordered an abortion of her approximately twenty-three-week-
old fetus.5
In the Orlando case, the twenty-three-year-old woman, identified
only as J.D.S., has the mental capacity of a one-year-old and commu-
nicates inaudibly.6 J.D.S.'s pregnancy did not place her in "imminent
danger.",7 As a DCF spokesperson explained, J.D.S., unlike the Miami
woman, had "no one to speak for her, not even herself.' 8 J.D.S. did
not have a guardian at the time of her pregnancy. 9 Governor Jeb Bush
I This Note uses terms such as "woman with mental retardation" or "person who has
mental retardation" instead of terms such as "the mentally retarded." This is consistent with the
"People First" movement: the person comes before the disability, conveying the message that a
disability does not define the whole person. "Persons first" terminology emphasizes that a dis-
ability is only one aspect of the person. E.g., MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ,
EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION ix-x (1999); AMERICAN Asso-
CIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION (AAMR), Fact Sheet: Self-Advocacy, http://www.aamr.
org/Policies/faq-movement.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2005) (discussing that the name "People
First" originated out of a "dislike of being called 'retarded"').
2 E.g., Melissa Harris, 2 Rape Cases Generate Scrutiny; Retarded Victims' Pregnancies







9 Anthony Colarossi, Disabled-Adults Panel Named; Group Will Look into Cases Like
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supported appointment of a guardian for J.D.S.,' 0 and eventually, a
court declared J.D.S. legally incapacitated and appointed a guardian."
With the appointment of a guardian for J.D.S., both she and the
Miami woman had surrogates to voice concerns on their behalf re-
garding the pregnancies. Yet, in J.D.S.'s case, Governor Bush also
pushed for a guardian for the fetus.' 2 If Governor Bush and DCF were
truly concerned about giving J.D.S. a voice, efforts should have fo-
cused exclusively on guardianship for J.D.S., not J.D.S. and the fetus.
On January 9, 2004, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal up-
held the trial court's decision that the appointment of a guardian for
J.D.S.'s fetus was improper. ' 3 Although J.D.S. had already given birth
to a baby girl, the court decided this case because this issue is "of
great public importance and capable of recurring."' 4 The Miami case
demonstrates that this type of case is indeed likely to recur. Despite
differences between the Miami and Orlando women's abilities to
communicate and the fetus's risk to maternal health, there are impor-
tant similarities, notably both women have severe mental retardation.
It is easy to see that the disputes involve the question of abortion.
Fetal representation is a political issue. Pro-life advocates may favor
fetal representation, and pro-choice advocates may disfavor fetal rep-
resentation. It is hard to imagine, therefore, that many proponents of
fetal guardianship would only push for fetal guardians in cases when
the pregnant woman has severe mental retardation and is unable to
communicate.
J.D.S. was an easier target than the Miami woman for appointment
of a fetal guardian. '5 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that fetal
guardianship proponents are likely to target women in future similar
situations.
That of Raped Retarded Woman, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., June 6, 2003, at B5. In response to
the J.D.S. case, Governor Jeb Bush created the Guardianship Working Group in June 2003 to
determine the number of people with developmental disabilities who may need guardians and to
identify problems within the system. Id.
10 See Les Kjos, Analysis: Fetus Rights Battle Continues, UNITED PRESS INT'L (Miami),
Jan. 13, 2004 (reporting a comment by the Governor's spokesman, Jacob Dipietre, that a guard-
ian for J.D.S. was necessary).
I I Colarossi, supra note 9.
12 Harris, supra note 2.
13 Wixtrom v. Dep't of Children & Families (In re Guardianship of J.D.S.), 864 So. 2d
534, 539 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
14 Id. at 537.
15 See Sherry Colb, Conflicts Arise over Rights of Pregnant Retarded Woman and Fetus,
CNN.COM, Aug. 29, 2003, available at LEXIS, News & Business, All News (noting that it is
"inescapable" that J.D.S.'s severe disability "makes her such an appealing candidate [as com-
pared to any woman, not just the Miami woman] for pro-life activist intervention" and hypothe-
sizing that the governor's supporters will deny that Bush's selection of J.D.S. was "purely op-
portunistic").
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While Florida law currently bans appointment of fetal representa-
tion in this abortion context,' 6 proponents and opponents remain vo-
cal. Despite the holding that a guardian for J.D.S.'s fetus was im-
proper, the concurring opinion in the case suggests that the state
legislature is the "appropriate forum to debate" the matter. 7 Yet, pro-
ponents are likely to also face challenges in the legislature. Many
conservative lawmakers who would support a fetal guardianship bill
acknowledge their limited legislative ability because other similar
anti-abortion bills have failed.' 8 While the debate over the propriety
of fetal representation may shift from the courts to legislatures, it is
unlikely to end any time soon.
This Note argues that courts and legislatures should not allow fetal
representation-either fetal guardians or fetal guardians ad litem-in
cases where a pregnant woman who has a guardian seeks an abortion.
Often (like J.D.S.), a woman in this situation will have mental retar-
dation. Part I provides background information on the diagnosis of
mental retardation, the relation between capacity and competency for
decision-making, and the similarities and differences between guardi-
ans and guardians ad litem. Part II explores the ethical arguments
against fetal representation. Fetal representation undermines a
woman's simulated autonomy and perpetuates the legacy of institu-
tional discrimination for women with mental retardation. Part I puts
forth doctrinal arguments regarding fetal representation. Existing
guardianship statutory frameworks do not provide for fetal represen-
tation. Furthermore, existing court proceedings and abortion laws al-
ready protect state interests in the potential life of the fetus and the
health of the mother. Fetal representation also creates a false conflict
between the mother and the fetus. Part IV considers practical argu-
ments concerning fetal representation. Fetal representation is ulti-
mately unworkable. How, for example, would a guardian determine
the "best interests" of the fetus? Furthermore, fetal representation re-
sults in a slippery slope putting other interests and rights in jeopardy.
Part V concludes that legislatures should not draft statutes that allow
fetal representation in the abortion context. If a legislature passes such
a statute, courts should exercise caution in upholding it. This Note
does not consider the constitutionality of fetal representation in the
abortion context.' 9
16 This Note does not discuss the propriety of fetal representation in other contexts, such as
child abuse or neglect, wrongful death, or refusal of medical treatment cases.
17 864 So. 2d at 540 (Orfinger, J., concurring).
18 Kjos, supra note 10.
19 For an argument on the unconstitutionality of fetal representation see Jill A. Wieber,
Note, Second-Hand Choice: An Incapacitated Pregnant Woman's Constitutional Right To
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Many of the ethical, doctrinal, and practical arguments regarding
fetal representation in this Note apply not only to pregnant women
with guardians but also to all pregnant women. Fetal representation
threatens the autonomy of all women. Existing guardianship statutes
do not provide for fetal representation for any woman. Fetal represen-
tation creates a false conflict between any pregnant woman and her
fetus. Current abortion law adequately protects state interests. In a
final example, determining the best interests of a fetus presents the
same difficulties regardless of a woman's competency. Why then,
does this Note argue, in particular, against fetal representation for
women who are incompetent? First, the threat of fetal representation
currently falls on women with guardians rather than all women. Sec-
ond, it is precisely because the threat targets only some women rather
than all women that this Note finds fetal representation for women
with guardians particularly problematic. Third, some arguments
against fetal representation are even stronger for women with guardi-
ans than for women without guardians. For instance, additional pro-
cedural protections for state interests exist for women with guardians.
Thus, this Note presents both general arguments pertaining to all
women and specific arguments pertaining to women with guardians.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Diagnosis of Mental Retardation
J.D.S. and the Miami woman mentioned in the introduction both
have a diagnosis of mental retardation. While these women represent
the controversy over fetal guardianship, they do not accurately repre-
sent all persons with mental retardation. How legislators and judges
perceive women with mental retardation affects how policies and
laws impact their lives. Therefore, they need an accurate understand-
ing of the condition of mental retardation.
Approximately 1 percent of the population meets diagnostic crite-
ria for mental retardation. 20 A person may be diagnosed with mental
Choose Abortion, 90 IOWA L. REV. 791, 808 (2005) (arguing that a fetal guardian creates a
"substantial obstacle" that interferes with the ability of a woman who is incompetent to choose
through her guardian). But see Carrie Ann Wozniak, Comment, Difficult Problems Call for New
Solutions: Are Guardians Proper for Viable Fetuses of Mentally Incompetent Mothers in State
Custody?, 34 STETSON L. REV. 193, 226 (2005) (arguing the constitutionality of fetal guardian-
ships of viable fetuses where the mother has a guardian because of mental incapacity and where
the state would gain custody upon birth); Helena Silverstein, In the Matter of Anonymous, a
Minor: Fetal Representation in Hearings To Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 11 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69, 102-03 (2001) (acknowledging that fetal guardianships are likely consti-
tutional in regards to minors as the purpose of a fetal guardian is to encourage birth by discour-
aging minors from waiving parental consent and having an abortion).
20 AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL Dis-
[Vol. 56:2
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retardation if she has significantly below-average general intellectual
functioning-measured by an IQ score of approximately seventy or
below.21 In addition, taking into account age and cultural considera-
tions, a person must have impairments in adaptive functioning in a
minimum of two of the following skills areas: "communication, self-
care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community re-
sources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health, and safety., 22 The diagnostic inclusion of functioning empha-
sizes that mental retardation is not necessarily a permanent diagnosis,
23as a person whose functioning improves will lose the diagnosis.
These symptoms must be present before the age of eighteen.24
In approximately 30-40 percent of cases, there is no clear cause
for the mental retardation. 25 Known predisposing factors are numer-
ous, including heredity, changes in embryonic development, underly-
ing medical conditions, and environmental influences during infancy
or childhood.26
Degrees of mental retardation are often attached to a diagnosis
based on the IQ score, including mild, moderate, severe, and pro-
found.27 About 85 percent of persons with mental retardation have
mild forms; such persons can usually live either independently or in
group homes with proper supports.28 Persons with severe mental re-
tardation comprise 3-4 percent of all those with mental retardation;
often, as adults, they are able to perform simple tasks in closely su-
pervised settings.a9 Individuals with either severe or profound mental
retardation are often limited in language but understand more than
can be expressed.3 °
Many persons with mental retardation, however, object to these la-
bels because the distinctions between degrees are based solely on IQ
scores and do not take into consideration actual abilities.31 The
ORDERS (DSM-IV) 46 (4th ed., text rev. 2000).
21 Id. at 41, 49. The DSM-IV notes that, with the exception of severity specifiers, its
criteria for mental retardation matches the criteria for mental retardation put forth by the
AAMR. Id. at 48; see also THE ARC & UNITED CEREBRAL PALSY (UCP) PUBLIC POLICY
COLLABORATION, 2004 LEGISLATIVE GOALS 3, available at http://www.ucp.org/uploads/2004
LegislativeGoals.doc (noting that a diagnosis of mental retardation takes into account
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior as well as its onset before age eighteen).
22 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 20, at 41, 49.
23 FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 30.
24 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 20, at 41,49.
25 Id. at 45.
26 Id. at 45-46.
27 Id. at 42-44.
28 Id. at 43.
29 Id. at 43-44.
30 FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 33.
3' Id. at 36.
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American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) does not use
these specifiers but creates distinctions based on "intensity and pat-
tern of support services: intermittent, limited, extensive, or perva-
sive. 32 Persons with mental retardation also object to being equated
to a mental age.33 Using a mental age results in a person viewing an
adult with mental retardation as a child, thereby underestimating his
or her abilities.34 Think back to reading the introduction of this Note;
upon hearing J.D.S. has the mental capacity of a one-year-old, how
did you view J.D.S in terms of her capabilities? Mental ages are also
relatively stagnant, although a person's abilities often increase over
time.35
The legal profession, however, does not always use the same dis-
tinctions as psychologists or developmental specialists. For example,
courts may refer to "borderline" mental retardation, although this is
not a clinical term.36 At other times, the courts essentially ignore dis-
tinctions in levels of functioning, viewing all degrees of mental retar-
dation as simply "mental retardation., 37 Reliance on mental age also
produces long-term consequences for those represented as a num-
ber-who would allow an eight-year-old to make reproductive
choices? 38 Yet, while this person may have an academic ability of an
eight-year-old, this number does not describe the person's emotional,
social, or sexual maturity.
39
B. Capacity and Competency
Many people with mental retardation make their own decisions,
including reproductive decisions. Courts presume that a person with
mental retardation is capable and competent to make decisions.
Therefore, a diagnosis of mental retardation does not equate to a de-
termination of incapacity or incompetence. Capacity generally refers
to a person's "actual ability to understand, appreciate, and form a
relatively rational intention with regard to some act."4 Mental retar-
dation may affect a person's capacity. Like the diagnosis of mental
retardation, capacity is based on present functioning. A determination
32 Id. at 31 (citing AAMR).
33 Id. at 36.
34 Id. at 38.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 31.
37 Id. at 33.
38 Id. at 38.
39 Id. at 38-39.
4 Steven B. Bisbing, Competency and Capacity: A Primer, in LEGAL MEDICINE 38, 38
(American College of Legal Medicine ed., 5th ed. 2001).
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of incapacity does not mean that the person will always be incapable
of performing a particular task.
States may legally define capacity to determine whether a person
is competent to make decisions.4' In defining capacity, state statutes
may take into account the person's ability for self-care, cognition, risk
of harm, and underlying conditions, such as mental retardation.4 3
Competency generally refers to a legal determination of capacity.43
Thus, courts may find a person incompetent when he or she fails a
legal standard of capacity, barring the person from performing a par-
ticular act.44
Capacity and competency are situational. For example, a court
may find a person incompetent to make financial decisions. The per-
son, however, is still legally presumed competent to make other deci-
sions, such as medical ones. If a person's competence to make medi-
cal decisions is later in question, a court may then decide whether the
person is competent in this regard. In determining competency for
medical decision-making, including abortion, a court generally con-
siders whether the person is capable of understanding the specific
treatment, making a rational decision regarding the treatment, and
communicating the decision verbally or nonverbally.45
While standards for capacity and competency are gender-neutral,
the assessment and application of these standards suggest gender
bias.46 As compared to men, courts find women disproportionately
incompetent, based, at least in part, on women's overrepresentation in
proceedings.47 Furthermore, judges may deliberately or inadvertently
insert value preferences when determining competency for a specific
act, producing seemingly inconsistent results that nonetheless produce
the desirable social outcome.48 For example, courts often find women
41 Id. at 39.
42 See Am. Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Law and Aging & Sally Hurme, Initiation of Guardi-
anship Proceedings, (Mar. 2004), http://www.abanet.org/aging/guardian2.pdf (providing a
comparison of state definitions of incapacity). Numerous other conditions, besides mental retar-
dation, affect capacity. Some conditions result in no decision-making capacity, such as those
responsible for a coma or a vegetative state. MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE
LAW OF BIOETHICS 472 (2003). As there is no capacity for persons with these conditions, these
persons are clearly incompetent. Id. Other conditions impair decision-making capacity, such as
dementia, brain injury, or serious mental illness. Id. Thus, these conditions may contribute to a
determination of incompetence.
43 Bisbing, supra note 40, at 38.
44Id.
45 Id.
46 Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory and Law, 47
U. MIAMi L. REv. 763, 768 (1993).
47 Id. at 768, 776 (citing studies finding that women are overrepresented in guardianship
and conservatorship proceedings).
48 Id. at 774.
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with mental retardation incompetent to consent to sexual intercourse
but competent to consent to put a child up for adoption, even taking
into account women with similar degrees of mental retardation.49
This Note focuses on women, particularly women with mental re-
tardation, whom courts have adjudicated as incompetent to make a
medical decision concerning abortion. Understanding the sexist appli-
cation of capacity and competency standards is important because it
challenges us to think about how sexism exists in court proceedings.
As women are found disproportionately incompetent as compared to
men, perhaps some women with mental retardation who are adjudi-
cated incompetent are actually competent. While this would not likely
apply to women with severe or profound forms of mental retardation,
like J.D.S., it may apply to women with milder forms. Therefore, for
these women, medical professionals, guardians, and courts should
continually assess capacity for medical decision-making, especially as
capacity may fluctuate.
Understanding that judges may consciously or unconsciously in-
sert value preferences is also important as abortion is often a strong,
controversial personal and political value preference. It motivates us
to think that perhaps some pro-life judges are using fetal representa-
tion to produce an outcome in line with their value preferences-
choosing childbirth over abortion. It is interesting to ponder possible
scenarios of women with similar degrees of mental retardation, some
wanting an abortion and some resisting an abortion, and whether
courts would find, disproportionately, those resisting an abortion as
competent and those wanting an abortion as incompetent.
C. Guardians and Guardians Ad Litem
As this Note focuses on women who are adjudicated incompetent,
an understanding of guardianship is necessary because courts typi-
cally appoint a guardian for a person who is incompetent. A guardian
is a court-appointed person who has authority over an individual's
person or property.50 The court defines the specific authority of a
guardian, often limiting it to health care, financial, or personal deci-
sions.5 1 A court may further define the scope of the guardian's author-
ity within a particular area, such as authorizing a guardian to make
major medical decisions while allowing the person adjudicated in-
49 Id. at 775.
50 BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 712 (7th ed. 1999); see also Bisbing, supra note 40, at 42
(defining guardianship as "the delegation by the state of authority over an individual's person or
estate to another party").
51 Bisbing, supra note 40, at 42.
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competent to make day-to-day medical decisions. 52 The purpose of
such limitations on a guardian's powers is to preserve an individual's
autonomy as much as possible. Sometimes, however, a court may
impose a general or plenary guardianship, granting the guardian broad
but not absolute powers over the individual's health care, financial,
and personal decisions.53 This Note addresses women who have
court-appointed guardians with authority over health care decisions,
including authority to make the abortion decision or to petition a court
for permission to have an abortion.
In making decisions, guardians or courts upon the guardian's peti-
tion for a medical procedure, use either a substituted judgment or best
interests standard. A substituted judgment standard asks the question:
"What would the person decide if she had been competent?" 54 A best
interests standard asks the question: "What decision best serves the
person's interests?, 55 Guardians or courts choose standards based on
particular state requirements. For women who never had capacity, the
best interests standard is applied de facto, even if still referred to as
substituted judgment.56 For either standard, when possible, the deci-
sion-maker takes into account the communicated preferences of the
person-found-incompetent thus enhancing her autonomy. Under the
substituted judgment standard, however, the communicated prefer-
ences are determinative.57
A Model Code of Ethics for Guardians, adopted by the National
Guardianship Association, emphasizes the guardian's moral duty to
take the person's preferences into account when making a decision on
behalf of the person.58 This moral duty exists to protect "the civil
rights and liberties" of the person and maximize "independence and
self-reliance., 59 The guardian has a duty to make a diligent effort to
involve the person in the decision-making process by investigating
previously stated and current preferences.6° This duty increases "in
direct proportion to the significance of the decision.' Therefore, a
52 Id.
53 See id.
5 See, e.g., id. at 42-43 (noting the difference between a subjective "substitute judgment"
approach and the objective "best interests" approach).
55 E.g., id.
56 FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 96; see also MICHAEL D. CASASANTO ET AL., A
MODEL CODE OF ETHICS FOR GUARDIANS 7 (1988), available at http://guardianship.
org/associations/2543/files/CODEOFET2.pdf (noting that the best interests standard is appro-
priate where there is no "previous competency" or where there is "no indication of preference
which could guide the guardian in making the decision").
57 FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 99.
58 CASASANTO ET AL., supra note 56, at 10.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 11.
61 Id.
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guardian who makes the abortion decision or petitions the court for an
abortion has a heightened duty to ascertain the person's preferences,
as abortion is a significant decision. The Model Code of Ethics for
Guardians recognizes that a guardian may override the person's pref-
erences if substantial harm will occur by carrying out the person's
preferences.62 If the guardian cannot determine prior or current pref-
erences, the guardian must then use the best interests standard.63
A guardian ad litem (GAL) is a guardian appointed during legal
proceedings.64 Thus, a GAL's authority is more limited in scope then
a plenary guardian or even a guardian with authority to make medical
decisions, as a GAL's authority typically exists only within the court-
room. Courts may also appoint a GAL where "a potential conflict ex-
ists between the usual decision-maker and the individual whose inter-
ests are at stake.",65 Generally, a GAL has a duty to represent the "best
interests" of the person-found-incompetent.
66
When a woman who is adjudicated incompetent becomes pregnant
and the guardian who has authority over her health care decisions
contemplates an abortion, the following decision-making contexts
may occur (1) if authorized by state statute, the guardian makes the
decision, taking into account the person-found-incompetent's prefer-
ences; or (2) the court makes the decision, upon the guardian's peti-
tion for an abortion, taking into account various actors' preferences.
The court may theoretically call upon a variety of actors in making a
decision, including (1) the woman; (2) the woman's guardian; (3) the
woman's GAL (representing the woman's best interests during the
hearing and acting as a check against guardian abuse); (4) a fetal
guardian; or (5) a fetal GAL. Presumably, the court would define the
scope of authority of the fetal guardian, perhaps allowing the fetal
guardian to not only make decisions regarding abortion but also deci-
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Susan Goldberg, Of Gametes and Guardians: The Impropriety of Appointing Guardians
Ad Litem for Fetuses and Embryos, 66 WASH. L. REV. 503, 505 (1991); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 50, at 712-13 (defining "guardian ad litem," along with other types of
guardians, under "guardian"). Because a guardian ad litem is a type of guardian, legal commen-
tators and courts often use the term "guardian" when referring to a "guardian ad litem" or just
confuse the two concepts entirely. A reader must then look at the specific context of the article
in determining whether "guardian" refers to a guardian ad litem or another type of guardian with
broader powers. See, e.g., Wixtrom v. Dep't of Children & Families (In re Guardianship of
J.D.S.), 864 So. 2d 534, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (Pleus, J., dissenting) (noting that the
petition was for a plenary guardian, yet the trial judge held appointment of a guardian ad litem
as improper); Silverstein, supra note 19 (interchangeably using "guardian" to refer to a "guard-
ian ad litem"). This Note will try to delineate the two concepts as much as possible or use the
term "fetal representation" when referring to both constructs.
65 Goldberg, supra note 64, at 505.
66 Id.
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sions regarding the types of medication the woman could take, the
kinds of food the woman could eat, or virtually any decision that may
impact the fetus. This Note will address only the issue of a court's
specification of the fetal guardian's authority to make decisions re-
garding abortion. A fetal GAL would represent the fetus's best inter-
ests exclusively during the court proceeding determining whether to
grant the guardian's petition for an abortion.
This Note argues against fetal representation either by fetal guardi-
ans or fetal GALs in the abortion context, assuming that a woman has
a guardian with authority for health care decisions. While many of the
arguments in this Note apply to all women who are incompetent, this
Note focuses on women who are incompetent and have mental retar-
dation. It does so for the following reasons: (1) J.D.S., the woman
igniting the controversy, has mental retardation, providing a personal-
ized lens in which to view the issue; and (2) there are additional con-
text-specific arguments against fetal representation for women with
mental retardation, specifically regarding the history of institutional
discrimination.
II. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS
Ethical principles of autonomy and equal treatment contribute to
the discussion of fetal representation.67 While these ethical principles
do not legally bind political institutions, they do inform legislatures
and courts on how they ought to resolve the issue of fetal representa-
tion for women with guardians. Fetal representation ultimately un-
dermines society's values of autonomy and equal treatment.68 This
67 This Note focuses on the ethical notion of equal treatment as it is broader than the con-
stitutional right to equal treatment. The Equal Protection Clause does not protect against all
forms of unequal treatment. As legislatures need only a rational basis to discriminate against
persons with disabilities, the Equal Protection Clause offers little utility in preventing disability-
based discrimination as compared to racial- or gender-based discrimination. FIELD & SANCHEZ,
supra note 1, at 13-15. Thus, even if fetal representation statutes do not violate an equal protec-
tion right to equal treatment, this Note argues that they still violate ethical notions of equal
treatment. Substantial literature exists concerning equal treatment beyond the Equal Protection
Clause. E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 1-2 (2000) (arguing that "[e]qual concern
is the soverign virtue of political community," and, thereby, "a precondition of political legiti-
macy").
68 One student author alludes to such arguments to support the claim that fetal guardian-
ship is inconsistent with the purpose of guardianship laws. Wieber, supra note 19, at 813-15. In
terms of equal treatment, the student author argues that fetal guardianship is a "sort of state-
sanctioned exploitation" because: (1) "the state is normally not able to appoint a guardian for the
fetus of a competent woman" and (2) "it enables the state to treat the [woman-found-
incompetent] differently based on her mental capacity." Id at 813-14. This Note elaborates on
such arguments. The student author also argues that a fetal guardian would thwart the ability of
the guardian to make decisions on the woman's behalf. Id. at 814-15. This Note directly relates
this argument to the principle of autonomy and further develops this thought.
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Note first discusses how fetal representation violates the simulated
autonomy of a woman who is incompetent by constraining her ability
to exercise her right to choose an abortion through her guardian. It
then argues that if political institutions allow fetal representation, they
will institutionally discriminate against women who are incompetent.
A. Simulated Autonomy and the "Right" to Choose
Autonomy literally means self-government. 69 A person exercises
autonomy through personal choices.70 Guardianship strips away the
legal authority to make particular kinds of choices. The concept of
guardianship recognizes that this legal absence of autonomy in certain
instances warrants beneficence. 7' Beneficence recognizes a duty "to
help others further their important and legitimate interests. 72 The
purpose of guardianship is to protect persons incapable of making
certain kinds of decisions.73 Guardianship essentially weakens a
person's legal autonomy by removing fundamental legal rights.74 Yet,
guardianship does not necessarily strip away all moral, or even all
legal, autonomy. For persons who are conscious yet incompetent,
including those with severe or profound mental retardation, residual
autonomy remains.75 Even under plenary guardianship, a person who
is incompetent may exercise autonomy, for example, through daily
clothing or meal choices, even if she cannot make medical
76decisions.
While this residual autonomy does not rise to the level of auton-
omy needed to exercise legal rights, society and courts may simulate
the higher level of autonomy needed to exercise a legal right. The
guardian, with surrogate decision-making power, simulates the per-
69 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 50, at 130.
70 See GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 42, at 81 (noting that autonomy is based on
the ideal of authenticity, depending on choice); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 68 (1989) (focusing on autonomous choices).
71 See CASASANTO ET AL., supra note 56, at 9 (noting that "the concept of guardianship is
rooted in the moral duty of beneficence").
72 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 70, at 194.
73 CASASANTO ET AL., supra note 56, at 9.
74 Id.
75 See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 70, at 68. Beauchamp and Chil-
dress do not adopt the term residual autonomy. Yet, they recognize that "some persons who in
general are not autonomous can at times make autonomous choices." Id. Thus, a logical exten-
sion is that if a person generally not autonomous can sometimes make autonomous choices,
there has to be some level of autonomy remaining to exercise those autonomous choices-
otherwise those choices could not be designated autonomous.
76 See id. (noting that "some patients in mental institutions who are generally unable to
care for themselves and have been declared legally incompetent may still be able to make
autonomous choices such as stating preferences for meals and making phone calls to acquaint-
ances").
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son's autonomy. Thus, although she is incompetent, society and
courts ought to treat her as competent through her guardian. This
means that rights initially removed through the guardianship process
be "reinstated" as long as the guardian acts as her surrogate in the
exercise of these rights. Therefore, the right to make reproductive de-
cisions, including the right to choose an abortion, should extend to a
woman who is incompetent, as long as this right is exercised through
her guardian. The guardian may directly exercise this right on the
woman's behalf or with the court's permission, depending on the ju-
risdiction.77 In this way, the woman who is incompetent only has a
right-exercisable-via-guardian, or a "right" to choose.
Why simulate autonomy to make reproductive decisions? First, for
some women who are incompetent, it provides a mechanism to en-
hance residual autonomy. Courts and society already find this desir-
able. The guardian's or court's inquiry into current preferences when
making decisions on the person's behalf maximizes this residual
autonomy. If residual autonomy was not respected, why inquire at all
into current preferences? Why not just make the decision without the
person's input? Although guardianship is inherently paternalistic,
since society values autonomy, guardians and courts consider current
preferences.
Second, simulating autonomy respects prior autonomy of an indi-
vidual who is now incompetent. Of course, some women with mental
retardation never were competent, so this argument would not apply.
It likely applies, however, for women with milder forms of mental
retardation. Courts and guardians already respect prior autonomy
when they inquire into past preferences before making a decision on
the person's behalf. If a woman who is now incompetent articulated
views while competent concerning abortion, guardians and courts
respect this prior autonomy by either making these views determina-
tive or taking these views into consideration.
Finally, simulating autonomy protects the woman's current interest
in autonomy. Although a court has declared her legally incompetent,
there is always a possibility that the court erred in its decision. 78 Soci-
ety values this current interest in autonomy as exemplified by the fact
77 See FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 139-44 (acknowledging that in some jurisdic-
tions a guardian may make the abortion decision whereas in other jurisdictions the guardian
needs court consent). The difference between jurisdictions regarding who decides is discussed in
another section of the Note. See discussion infra Part lI.B. For now, what is important is recog-
nizing that both ways tie into exercising the right to choose.
78 Remember, courts may disproportionately find women incompetent compared to men.
See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. This suggests that courts do make mistakes. Of
course, the mistake could be that courts should be finding more men incompetent rather than
finding more women competent.
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that guardians and courts already inquire into a woman's current pref-
erences.
In order to maximize reproductive autonomy, if the guardian and
the woman agree on a choice regarding abortion, that choice could
prevail. Yet, in order to guard against guardian abuse, states may bal-
ance autonomy with paternalism/beneficence, and require that even if
the guardian and the woman agree, the court still makes the final de-
cision. Thus, if the woman and her guardian agree, states have a
choice between allowing the guardian or court to make the final deci-
sion, depending on the value the state places on autonomy. If the
guardian and the woman, however, do not agree on the abortion deci-
sion, court oversight may actually protect the woman's current inter-
est in autonomy more so than allowing the guardian to exercise a
choice contrary to the woman's current expressed preferences. Al-
though coming before the court still legally incompetent, the court
would essentially reevaluate the woman's competency to make the
abortion decision. Thus, there is another check to determine whether
her expressed preferences should prevail.
Some may argue, however, that simulated autonomy does not go
far enough in protecting the reproductive rights and interests of
women who are incompetent. Perhaps, residual autonomy, although
not the ideal level of autonomy, should be enough to exercise a legal
reproductive right. Some scholars argue that women who have
guardians-at least women with mental retardation who can commu-
nicate-should be allowed to make reproductive decisions that in-
clude abortion, without third party interference, despite a lack of ca-
pacity to make the medical decision.79 Therefore, if a woman can
express a preference after receiving relevant information, even with-
out a full understanding of that information, the preference equates to
legal consent.80 This approach stands in contrast to current law in all
states.8 ' Why consider adopting such a seemingly drastic approach?
Procreative decision-making, unlike some other types of decision-
making, does not always involve intellectual processes or have a
"right" answer. 82 Furthermore, this best protects any current interest
in autonomy.83 It also enhances residual autonomy more so than
79 FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 60-61, 158, 179.
80 Id. at 191.
s lId. at 60.
8 Id.
s3 See id at 129 (recognizing that "persons who have guardians still may have authority to
make the particular decision at issue").
[Vol. 56:2
ARGUMENTS AGAINST FETAL REPRESENTATION
simulating autonomy through a guardian. Finally, perhaps most im-
portantly, this approach prioritizes equal treatment over protection.84
As a current abandonment of the guardianship system appears
unlikely, this Note urges that we view the guardianship system holis-
tically. It is based on beneficence; yet, recognizing simulated auton-
omy keeps the principles of autonomy and equal treatment in the fore-
front alongside beneficence.
Fetal representation violates the principle of autonomy, whether
actual or simulated, by inserting a fetus's voice (whose choice is pre-
sumptively birth) into the decision-making process. This is why
courts generally do not appoint fetal representation before a woman
decides whether or not to have an abortion. Society recognizes abor-
tion as the woman's choice, not the fetus's choice. If pregnant women
who are incompetent have fetal representation but not other pregnant
women, this fetal representation undermines simulated autonomy, as
the purpose of simulated autonomy is to treat people who are incom-
petent similar to people who are competent in terms of decision-
making. Fetal representation thus constrains the ability of a woman
through her guardian to exercise her choice-whether for or against
an abortion.
B. Institutional Discrimination
As the purpose of simulated autonomy is to treat women who are
incompetent similar to women who are competent, the guardian
should exercise on the woman's behalf any reproductive rights pos-
sessed by a competent woman. States have a history of institutionally
discriminating against women with mental retardation based on both
gender and disability, especially concerning reproductive rights. Fetal
representation perpetuates the legacy of institutional discrimination in
regards to reproductive rights for women who have mental retardation
and who are incompetent.
Institutional discrimination refers to arrangements or practices in
social institutions that tend to favor one group over another.85 Social
institutions include structures such as the family and the state.86 Po-
84 Id. at 159, 215.
85 JOHN E. FARLEY, MAJORITY-MINORITY RELATIONS 16 (4th ed. 2000). In discussing
discrimination throughout the book, Farley focuses on discrimination towards racial and ethnic
groups. Farley notes that institutional discrimination usually favors the majority group. Id. He
emphasizes, however, that much of what is true regarding relations between racial or ethnic
groups is also true about people with and without disabilities. Id. at 12. "[Allthough this book is
mainly about race and ethnic relations, many of the principles apply to other kinds of majority-
minority relations, or intergroup relations, as well." Id.
86 Id. at 16.
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litical institutions, such as courts and legislatures, are also social insti-
tutions. Institutional discrimination is not always conscious but often
results as a by-product of past deliberate discrimination.87 This Note
emphasizes institutional discrimination rather than individual dis-
crimination. While we may not approve of individual discrimination,
it is more morally problematic if social institutions do not treat people
equally. This Note breaks down the term institutional discrimination
and focuses on the narrower category of invidious institutional dis-
crimination. Invidious institutional discrimination refers to institu-
tional discrimination motivated by prejudice. Prejudice refers to overt
and subtle "attitudes and beliefs that tend to favor one group over an-
other or to cause unequal treatment., 88 Thus, state action is likely to
be considered invidious if the action is not consistent across groups
without a morally acceptable justification. If state action meets crite-
ria for invidious institutional discrimination, it should raise a red flag
that such action is particularly morally problematic.
This Note first considers the history of institutional discrimination
against women with mental retardation, including those who are in-
competent. It then argues that if legislatures or courts allow fetal rep-
resentation only for women who are incompetent, their actions consti-
tute invidious institutional discrimination due to their inconsistency in
allowing groups the right to choose an abortion.
1. History
In the early 1800s, persons with mental retardation were subject to
institutional discrimination. Persons viewed "retarded" lived with
family, in public facilities as wards of the state, or were "auctioned-
out" to strangers who were paid to provide care.8 9 Those who lived
with family were usually well cared for and tutored, while those who
lived with paid caretakers or in public facilities were often subject to
abuse.90
By the 1880s, however, institutional discrimination unquestionably
became invidious institutional discrimination. Society's worsening
attitudes regarding mental retardation were due, in part, to the popu-
larity of the eugenics theory, arguing the heritability of mental retar-
dation.91 Women with mental retardation of child-bearing age were no
longer regarded as "unfortunates" but as "immoral" or "criminal" and
87 Id. at 17.
88 Id. at 14.
89 FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 9.
9 Id.
91 Id. at 10.
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possessing aggressive, uncontrollable sexual drives.92 These are
prejudicial attitudes and beliefs because they are based on inaccurate
stereotypes. 93 This prejudice led to state-sanctioned policy changes-
essentially invidious institutional discrimination. Women were placed
in all-female institutions and received forced sterilization. 94 This prac-
tice continued throughout the early- and mid-i 900s.95 Young women
who were fortunate enough to live with families were not legally al-
lowed to marry in most states and often subject to mandatory sterili-
zation.96 From 1950 to 1970, federal funding prompted a building
craze for institutions, increasing those who lived in institutions by 65
percent.97 Yet federal funding was not available for operating ex-
penses, contributing to poor care and conditions.
98
The Supreme Court case of Buck v. Bell 9 upheld the practice of
sterilization. The Court upheld a Virginia statute that authorized "ster-
ilization of mental defectives" based on eugenics theory. °° In a fa-
mous opinion, Justice Holmes wrote, "It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."1°1 Referring specifically
to Carrie Buck, whose mother and child were supposedly also "fee-
ble-minded," Holmes declared, 'Three generations of imbeciles are
enough."'' 0 2 In fact, Carrie Buck did not have mental retardation but
was an unwed mother placed in the institution after a rape, as was
common practice.10 3 Her own attorney was allegedly a eugenics sup-
porter, colluding with supporters of the sterilization law in bringing a
lawsuit to encourage sterilization.' °4 The Court's decision is another
example of invidious institutional discrimination, especially as it has
never been overruled.
Near the second half of the twentieth century, science and society
rejected the eugenics movement, prompting sterilization reform
92 Id.
93 Today, it is accepted that individuals with mental retardation do not have a greater or
lesser sex drive as compared to individuals without mental retardation. Id. at 11l. Furthermore,
most people with mental retardation, like most other people, learn to control their sexual im-
pulses appropriately and are capable of sexual relationships. Id.
94 Id. at 10.
95 Id. at 10-11.
96 Id. at 11.
97 Id. at 66-67.
98 Id. at 67.
- 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
100Id. at 205-06.
101 Id. at 207.
1I2d.
103 FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 68.
04 Id.
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laws. 105 Also contributing to the reform movement, courts and legisla-
tures had a heightened awareness of reproductive privacy in general,
and mental retardation became conceptualized under a developmental
perspective.' °6 At this time, there was also a movement towards dein-
stitutionalization and "normalization." Normalization promoted inde-
pendence, including respect for the sexual autonomy of persons with
mental retardation. 0 7
These sterilization reform laws aim to protect the interest in pro-
creating of a woman who has mental retardation.10 8 The court deter-
mines whether or not the person is competent to make an informed
medical decision about sterilization, and if incompetent, courts use
either a substituted judgment or best interests standard to make a de-
cision regarding sterilization.1 9 A few states, however, outright
banned sterilization of persons found incompetent." 0 Today, states
still struggle over how best to balance protecting persons with mental
retardation from abusive sterilization practices and providing access
to sterilization."' The sterilization reform laws reflect efforts to rid
society of the effects of past invidious institutional discrimination.
The sterilization laws that require court oversight are similar to the
laws in many states requiring court oversight of abortion. These court
proceedings are not necessarily examples of invidious institutional
discrimination. Allowing fetal representation in these court proceed-
ings, however, perpetuates the past legacy of institutional discrimina-
tion and perhaps even invidious institutional discrimination.
2. Consistency
Fetal representation is institutional discrimination because it favors
women who are competent over women who are incompetent. Only
women who are incompetent would face a fetal guardian or GAL in a
court proceeding in order to obtain an abortion. Institutions who allow
fetal representation in this context perpetuate institutional
discrimination.
105 Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and
Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 809-12. Even though science and society rejected the
eugenics movement, heredity is still a factor in some cases of mental retardation. As noted in the
background section, however, there are other causes of mental retardation, including medical
conditions and environmental influences as well as other unknown causes. AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, supra note 20, at 45-46; see also FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 75 (noting that "the
underlying theory of negative eugenics is considered invalid").
106 Scott, supra note 105, at 809-14.
107Id. at 815-16.
108 Id. at 807.
1091d. at 817-18.
10ld.
I FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 80.
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The next issue then is whether this institutional discrimination is
invidious. One may argue that fetal guardianship reflects the belief of
promoting childbirth over abortion. This belief is not necessarily
prejudice. Yet, proponents of fetal guardianship target women who
are incompetent, like J.D.S., rather than all women. This targeting
may simply reflect strategy-go after the "easy" cases before advo-
cating fetal representation for all women. The attitude that women
who are incompetent are "easy targets," however, reflects prejudice,
as it results in unequal treatment by targeting only women who are
incompetent. On the other hand, one may not agree that pro-life advo-
cates are only targeting women who are incompetent. Pro-life advo-
cates may not intend to discriminate because they may support fetal
representation for all women.
Pro-life advocates, however, are not social institutions. Invidious
institutional discrimination will only occur if courts or legislatures
allow fetal representation solely for women-found-incompetent based
on prejudicial motives. Legislators or judges who act primarily as
sympathizers to these pro-life advocates and allow fetal guardianship
would cross the line into invidious discrimination. Note that this par-
allels the lawyer's alleged collusion in Buck v. Bell. Yet, legislators or
judges who are not motivated by a pro-life agenda but would still al-
low fetal guardians only for women who are incompetent are likely
still invidiously discriminating. Remember, prejudice can also be sub-
tle.1 2 Such legislators or judges may not even be aware of their own
prejudice. The underlying prejudicial belief is that women who are
incompetent are not deserving of the same reproductive rights as
women who are competent. Thus, the legacy of institutional invidious
discrimination regarding reproductive interests would continue.
Therefore, regardless of the intent of pro-life advocates, it is the
actions of legislatures and courts on this issue of fetal representation
that matter, as this Note's focus is institutional discrimination. An
understanding of Ronald Dworkin's principle of institutional integ-
rity 1 3 further illuminates this discussion on the institutional nature of
discrimination regarding fetal representation. Integrity can be divided
into two forms: legislative integrity and adjudicative integrity." 14 Leg-
islative integrity requires legislatures to ensure that a new law is co-
herent in principle to existing laws."15 Adjudicative integrity requires
judges to interpret and enforce a law as coherent to other laws.16
112 FARLEY, supra note 85, at 14.
"3 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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Judges, therefore, must not engage in "independent crusades."'"17
Along with perpetuating institutional discrimination, if legislatures
allow fetal representation only for women who are incompetent or if
the courts uphold such legislation or allow fetal representation
through existing guardianship laws, then our institutions also violate
their integrity.
Regardless of society's division over the correct way to handle
abortion issues, our political institutions can still maintain integrity
when they nonetheless act in a single, coherent way regarding abor-
tion.1 8 Integrity thereby rejects a "checkerboard" or arbitrary ap-
proach to resolving the divisive moral issue of abortion.19 For exam-
ple, a checkerboard approach to abortion would allow only women
born in even years to have an abortion but not women born in odd
years. 120 This is essentially a Solomonic internal compromise between
pro-life and pro-choice groups. A checkerboard approach is also
inherently discriminatory because it results in an unequal effect of a
policy. 122
Mandating fetal representation for women with guardians seeking
an abortion but not other women is a checkerboard approach to the
issue of fetal representation in abortion proceedings. Our instincts
may question, however, whether this distinction is truly arbitrary in
the same way as the distinction between even and odd years. Yet, it is
arbitrary if we view the distinction as an internal compromise. On one
side, pro-life advocates may argue "fetal representation for every-
one," and, on the other side, pro-choice advocates may argue "no fetal
representation for anyone." An internal compromise, therefore, is "fe-
tal representation for some." Who is the "some" becomes arbitrary-
in this case, the "some" is women with guardians. Therefore, political
institutions who allow this approach violate integrity. Political institu-
tions would also discriminate, as the effect of fetal representation falls
squarely on these women.
Why, however, not prefer a checkerboard approach, producing an
internal compromise rather than a winner-take-all scheme? 23 The
17 Id. at 410.
118 See id at 166 ("Integrity becomes a political ideal when we make the same demand of
the state or community taken to be a moral agent, when we insist that the state act on a single,
coherent set of principles even when its citizens are divided about what the right principles of
justice and fairness really are.").
"
19 1d. at 178-79.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 178 (describing a Solomonic compromise as one "of trades and compromises so
that each body of opinion is represented ... in the final result").
122 See FARLEY, supra note 85, at 16 (acknowledging that institutional discrimination does
not necessarily focus on intent but on the unequal effect of a policy).
1
23 DWORKIN, supra note 113, at 179.
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primary problem with an institution adopting a checkerboard ap-
proach is that, in doing so, it acts unprincipled, as it "must endorse
principles to justify part of what it has done that it must reject to jus-
tify the rest."' 24 Thus, institutional integrity demands consistency in
principle. 125 Consistency in both legislative and adjudicative integrity
is not simply following past precedent if that past precedent conflicts
with the system's fundamental principles. 126 One of our government's
fundamental principles is an egalitarian principle. Integrity thereby
requires that our government "settle on a single conception [of an
egalitarian principle] that it will not disavow in any decision, includ-
ing those of policy. '127 Integrity assumes "that each person is as wor-
thy as any other, that each must be treated with equal concern accord-
ing to some coherent conception of what that means."1 28 Thus, courts
cannot simply uphold a law favoring one group but not others just
because it is past precedent, as integrity condemns special treatment
unless it can be justified in principle. 129 Institutional integrity, then,
protects against partiality.1 30 In doing so, institutional integrity also
protects against invidious institutional discrimination. If special
treatment cannot be justified in principle, unequal treatment suggests
a prejudicial motivation.
Integrity and consistency, however, do not always demand equal-
ity. 131 A legislature, for example, may find a justification in principle
for special treatment in that favoring one group is best for the general
interest.32 The legislature may only confer a benefit to one group
while excluding other groups if there is a relevant difference between
groups. Integrity, however, requires that the legislature not grant spe-
cial treatment to one group simply because that one group only has a
'
24 Id. at 183-84.
125 Id. at 184.
1
2 6 Id. at 219. Integrity demands not only consistency among abortion laws but also consis-
tency among abortion laws and other types of laws as well as the system as a whole. See id. at
179, 184, 251. Dworkin emphasizes that judges interpreting the law aim to make "the law co-
herent as a whole" even if this calls for "ignoring academic boundaries and reforming some
departments of law radically to make them more consistent in principle with others." Id. at 251.
Dworkin does realize, however, that departmentalization may be necessary based on certain
moral principles, such as the separate departments between criminal and civil law, as moral
principles distinguish types of fault or responsibility. Id. at 252.
127 Id. at 222.
128 Id. at 213.
1291d. at 219-20. As an example, Dworkin points to British law that exempted barristers
from professional liability, even though other professions remained liable. Id. at 219. While a
narrow approach to consistency would require continuing this exception, integrity requires
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right to that benefit. 133 Thus, integrity demands that institutions
"strive to protect for everyone what it takes to be their moral and po-
litical rights, so that public standards express a coherent scheme of
justice and fairness."' 134 Regardless how we feel about a particular
law, the law acts on everyone equally.
Consistency, with regards to fetal representation, would mandate
either fetal representation for all women or fetal representation for no
women. Currently, the law does not mandate fetal representation for
adult women seeking an abortion. A law allowing fetal representation
for women who are incompetent is inconsistent with current law. The
issue next becomes whether there is a justification in terms of the
general interest for special treatment for women who are incompetent.
This Note considers, and rejects, some possible justifications below.
It argues that the primary purported justification essentially asserts the
theory that women who are incompetent do not have the same repro-
ductive rights as women who are competent. Integrity in an egalitar-
ian scheme rejects this type of justification giving moral or political
rights only to some, as the above discussion demonstrates. This justi-
fication also reflects a prejudicial belief that institutional discrimina-
tion rejects.
Let us consider the argument that women who are incompetent do
not have the same right to choose an abortion as women who are
competent, and, therefore, this difference justifies fetal guardianship
for only women who are incompetent. There are two responses. First,
if we value simulated autonomy, even if not the same right, we allow
guardians to exercise the right to choose on behalf of the woman. This
is essentially what a court decided regarding the reproductive right of
sterilization. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recog-
nized that the "personal decision" to "bear or beget a child is a right
so fundamental that it must be extended to all persons, including
those who are incompetent."1 35 This is accomplished through substi-
tuted judgment, whereby the court or guardian makes the decision as
the woman would make if she were competent. 136 Abortion, like ster-
ilization, certainly involves the fundamental issue of bearing or beget-
ting a child. Thus, even if guardianship legally takes away the right to
133 Id.
134Id.
135 In re Moe, 579 N.E.2d 682, 685 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (citing the Supreme Judicial
Court decision In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982)); see also Daniel Pollack et al., The
Capacity of a Mentally Retarded Person To Consent: An American and Jewish Legal Perspec-
tive, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 197, 199 (2000) (noting that "[c]ourts have held that
the decision of whether to carry to term or to abort a child is a fundamental right held by all
citizens," including those with mental retardation or adjudicated incompetent).
136Moe, 579 N.E.2d at 685.
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choose, we give that ight back as long as the guardian exercises that
ight as a surrogate decision-maker. The goal with simulated auton-
omy is to treat a woman who is incompetent as competent. By using
simulated autonomy, we honor the idea that all women have the ight
to choose an abortion. To have fetal guardianships for only some
women offends the notion of simulated autonomy and undermines its
goal of equal treatment.
Second, even if one wishes to reject the simulated autonomy ar-
gument and assume that a woman who is incompetent does not have
the ight to choose, there is still unequal treatment in terms of protect-
ing reproductive interests. Even for women with severe or profound
mental retardation who have never been competent, these women still
have important interests in bodily integrity, physical well-being, and
procreative capacity, even if self-determination is not applicable.
37
Restricting a woman who is incompetent so that she does not have the
ability to have an abortion that a woman who is competent can have
denies that woman's dignity interest in equal treatment. 38 In a sterili-
zation context, the California Supreme Court asserted: "An incompe-
tent developmentally disabled woman has no less interest in a satisfy-
ing or fulfilling life free from the burdens of an unwanted pregnancy
than does her competent sister."'
139
A proponent of fetal representation may also argue that justifiable
unequal treatment already exists between women who are incompe-
tent and women who are competent in terms of accessing an abortion
and that fetal representation is simply an extension of this justifiable
unequal treatment. Requiring court supervision before a woman who
is incompetent accesses an abortion may be justified as guarding the
woman against potential guardian abuse. Fetal representation, how-
ever, does not even purport to advance such a goal. Fetal representa-
tion aims to guard the fetus by presumably advocating birth.
Furthermore, even if some unequal treatment exists, we can strive
to promote equal treatment as much as possible in terms of access and
process. The most effective way to promote the dignity of persons
who have never been competent is to afford "access to beneficial re-
sults which competent patients could, and likely would, choose under
similar circumstances."140 While the results are important, so is the
process. The process in achieving those results, such as the choice
137 Norman L. Cantor, The Relation Between Autonomy-Based Rights and Profoundly
Mentally Disabled Persons, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 37,44 (2004).
138 See id. at 45.
139 Mildred G. v. Valerie N. (Conservatorship of Valerie N.), 707 P.2d 760, 777 (Cal.
1985).
140 Cantor, supra note 137, at 79.
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regarding abortion, should be as close as possible to the process that
women without disabilities goes through. Fetal representation devi-
ates too far from the "standard" process of making a decision whether
or not to have an abortion, especially as there is no convincing justifi-
cation as to why fetal representation ought to apply to women who
are incompetent and not women who are competent.
There are some possible justifications for unequal treatment but
none are convincing. Advocates of fetal representation generally point
to state interests in the potential life of the fetus; 41 yet, as explained
below, this argument would then apply to all women. Some, however,
may argue that the state's interest is greater in the potential life of a
fetus for a woman who is incompetent. Possibly, the state's interest in
potential life is more likely to be protected by a competent adult
mother because of inherent motherly affection for her potential off-
spring. This argument fails because competent women may not nec-
essarily feel affection for a fetus, particularly in the early stages of a
pregnancy. Also, it assumes that the guardian will not feel a similar
affection for the offspring. Often, the guardian is a relative of the
woman, such as her mother, so the guardian may also feel affection.
Most importantly, it also erroneously assumes that a person who is
incompetent is not capable of affection. Even if there is greater affec-
tion, it may hardly adequately protect the state's interest in potential
life, as it depends on the woman herself and, clearly, competent
women do have abortions. Another suggestion is that the difference in
treatment lies in the fact that fetal representation is necessary to en-
sure that the guardian accurately takes into account the health and life
risks to the mother. 142 Yet, as argued in Part HLI.B, existing procedures
are adequate to address these concerns. Such different treatment
without convincing justification offends the idea of equality.
In addition to women with disabilities, fetal guardianship propo-
nents in the abortion context also target minors. Although the appro-
priateness of fetal representation in regard to minors is beyond the
scope of this Note, comparing fetal representation for these two
groups illustrates the unequal treatment towards women with guardi-
ans in the abortion decision-making process. 143
141 See M. Todd Parker, Comment, A Changing of the Guard: The Propriety of Appointing
Guardians for Fetuses, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1419, 1421, 1467 (2004). The author acknowledges
that he does not consider the issue of whether fetal representation "could be required whenever a
competent woman pursues an abortion." Id. at 1467.
142 Id. at 1466.
143 Field and Sanchez similarly adopt a comparative approach between minors and women
who are incompetent to demonstrate the unequal treatment towards women with guardians in
the abortion decision-making process, illustrating the helpfulness in such a comparison. FIELD &
SANCH-tFz, supra note 1, at 162-65. "Nothing demonstrates the existence of a state agenda more
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While states may require a minor to receive parental consent be-
fore obtaining an abortion, states must also provide the minor the op-
portunity to seek a court waiver of that consent.' 44 In Alabama, a cou-
ple of judges routinely appoint a fetal guardian during waiver
proceedings. 145 Four judges in the Alabama Supreme Court explicitly
support the practice, with the five other judges implicitly consenting
through silence on the issue. 146 In Florida, a trial judge similarly ap-
pointed a guardian ad litem for the fetus of a minor, yet the Supreme
Court of Florida held that the appointment was "clearly improper."'
' 47
Imagine a state sets up a new procedure for minors seeking an
abortion such that even minors with parental consent must attend a
court hearing with a parent present. The consenting parent, rather than
the minor, must then face an adversarial fetal guardian. It is hard to
imagine such a scenario taking place. An initial question may be, why
the parent? The parent is an adult, presumably capable of weighing
the benefits and consequences of an abortion for his or her child.
Yet, this is essentially the scenario for a woman who has a guard-
ian. Minors are similarly legally considered incompetent, and a par-
ent, generally, is the legal guardian. While a guardian must seek court
approval for the woman's abortion and the parent does not, both are
apparently able to weigh the benefits and consequences of an abortion
for the person within their legal care. In some ways, a guardian is in a
better position than a parent to make the decision. When a person be-
comes a parent, the court does not approve such a status to ensure that
the person will make decisions with the minor's best interests in
mind. Yet, such a procedure is in place when a person becomes a
guardian because the guardian has a fiduciary duty to use substituted
judgment or act in her best interest. Furthermore, court consent, in
many states, serves as an additional safeguard to make sure the guard-
ian acts appropriately. There is no comparable court hearing if a par-
ent consents to an abortion.
What is important is with whom the fetal guardian is in an adver-
sarial position. In one context, the fetal guardian is in an adversarial
position with the parent, and, in the other context, the fetal guardian is
in an adversarial position with the "competent" guardian. The guard-
ian acts as the competent voice of his or her ward. If a fetal guardian
conclusively than a comparison of the legal treatment of persons who have mental retardation
with that of others usually deemed legally incompetent, such as children." Id. at 162. Yet, their
concern is not with fetal representation. Their comparison is between minors and women who
are incompetent regarding third-party reproductive decision-making. Id. at 162-65.
144 Silverstein, supra note 19, at 69.
145 Id. at 87.
146 ld. at 85-86.
147 In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1189-90 (Fla. 1989).
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is in an adversarial position with the "competent" guardian, then why
not have a fetal guardian for all competent women? Furthermore, if
the purpose of fetal guardianship is to promote the state's interest in
childbirth, does this interest not apply to all women? 148 There is no
difference in the fetuses of women who are incompetent, women who
are competent, and minors. The concurring opinion in the J.D.S. case
recognizes that the issue cannot be framed as applying to only women
found incompetent, arguing that
viewing the problem through that narrow a lens distorts the
real issue of the scope, if any, of fetal rights. If a fetus has
rights, then all fetuses have rights. And, if a fetus is a person,
then all fetuses are people, not just those residing in the
womb of an incompetent mother. 49
The concurring judge acknowledges that it is "inviting" to think
about the issue narrowly, yet also acknowledges "it would be danger-
ous to do so when the potential for state intrusion into the lives of
women is so significant."1 50
Unequal treatment regarding fetal representation between women
who are incompetent and women who are competent is without
justification, regardless of intent. Governmental institutions should
not allow fetal representation since it offends ethical notions of equal
treatment regarding both substantive "rights" and the process in
exercising those "rights." Unequal treatment in this context
undermines autonomy, perpetuates unfair reproductive institutional
discrimination for women with mental retardation, and violates
institutional integrity.
Ill. DOCTRINAL ARGUMENTS
While ethical principles of autonomy and equal treatment suggest
why institutions should not allow fetal representation in the abortion
context for women who are incompetent, legal doctrines suggest that
the current legal framework does not support fetal representation.
Current guardianship statutes do not protect fetuses. The law already
protects both procedural and substantive fetal interests. Furthermore,
148 See Silverstein, supra note 19, at 108 (observing that "if the presence of guardians in
waiver hearings is constitutional, we should not be surprised to see future regulations that re-
quire adult women to meet with a designated representative of the fetus prior to obtaining an
abortion").
149 Wixtrom v. Dep't of Children & Families (In re Guardianship of J.D.S.), 864 So. 2d
534, 541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (Orfinger, J., concurring).
150Id.
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fetal representation creates a false conflict between the mother and
the fetus, as it is the state's interest in the potential life of the fetus
that conflicts with the mother's interests.
A. Guardianship and GAL Statutes
In the J.D.S. case, the state of Florida contended that fetal guardi-
anship is "neither new, nor novel," arguing that courts consider fetal
interests in wrongful death cases. 51 While courts have appointed rep-
resentation for fetuses in wrongful death cases as well as neglect,
homicide, and refusal of medical treatment cases, abortion cases are
different because the fetus is not recognized as having any rights in
the abortion decision. Roe v. Wade' 52 acknowledged that courts have
recognized the unborn as having rights or interests in other contexts,
specifically in property cases, and noted that guardians ad litem have
represented fetal interests. 153 Yet, the Court emphasized that fetuses
have never been legally recognized as "persons in the whole
sense." 154 The Court ultimately held that a fetus is not a person for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
55
This idea that a fetus is not a person is important in deciding
whether or not guardianship or GAL statutes cover fetal representa-
tion in an abortion context. In In re D.K.,156 a lower court appointed a
guardian ad litem1 57 for the fetus of a hospitalized woman with
schizophrenia. 58 The fetal GAL then successfully obtained an order
restraining the mother from taking any potentially harmful medication
and from having an abortion. In addition, the fetal GAL petitioned for
a guardian for D.K.159 The Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery
Division, held appointment of a fetal guardian ad litem "improper"
prior to viability.' 60 The court reasoned that a guardian ad litem can
only represent a person, stating that "[t]he reference to 'person' [in
1s Kjos, supra note 10.
132 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'
5 3 Id. at 162.
154Id.
'
5 5 Id. at 158.
156 497 A.2d 1298 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
157 The court uses the term "guardian" throughout the opinion but looks to a guardian ad
litem statute in its analysis. Therefore, it appears that by "guardian" the court really refers to a
"guardian ad litem." Id.
1581d. at 1300. While D.K. had a mental illness and not mental retardation, persons with
mental illness and mental retardation have faced sinilar types of oppression, including institu-
tionalization and stigmatization. Despite the similarities, mental illness and mental retardation
are "distinct phenomena," as mental retardation is a developmental disorder associated with
lower intellectual functioning, and mental illnesses are often psychiatric disorders frequently
associated with impaired emotional functioning. FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 24.
159497 A.2d at 1300.
160Id. at 1301.
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the guardian ad litem statute] is significant."' 6' The court went on to
say that "[a] fetus is not a person," citing Roe. 162 The court further
noted that the mother has constitutional control of the fetus until vi-
ability and that a guardian must exercise that control for a mother
who is incompetent. 63 The court, however, left open the possibility of
fetal guardianship after viability, noting that if future proceedings im-
plicated fetal interests, the court may find it necessary to appoint a
fetal GAL. 64
The Court of Appeal of Florida used similar logic in denying ap-
pointment of a fetal guardian 165 for J.D.S. The court noted that the
guardianship statute specified that a guardian acted on behalf of a per-
son. 16 6 No Florida statute or case law defined a fetus as a person; in-
stead, the court cited cases (such as Roe and In re D.K.) finding that a
fetus is not a person. 167 The guardianship statute also neither explic-
itly mentions nor defines a fetus, although the legislature had done so
in other contexts. 68 Unlike the D.K. court, the J.D.S. majority did not
hint at a possible distinction between nonviability and viability. Even
if a fetus has reached viability, however, it is still not a person until
birth. Viability is only meaningful because this is the point that the
state's interest in potential life becomes compelling.1 69 As guardian-
ship and GAL statutes refer to a person, a viable fetus is still not in-
cluded. Thus, the D.K. court's entertainment of the possibility of fetal
representation for a viable fetus is inconsistent with its own analysis.
Under the current framework of guardianship and GAL statutes, the
fetus is not protected until birth.
It is worth considering, however, the possibility that the definition
of person for guardianship and GAL statutes may be different from
the definition of person in the Fourteenth Amendment context. The
D.K. and J.D.S. courts chose to adopt the Roe definition of person,




16sAs noted in note 64, the petition was for a guardian but the trial court denied appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem. The majority opinion frames the issue as "whether the trial court
had the authority to appoint a fetal guardian pursuant to Florida's guardianship statutes." Wix-
trom v. Dep't of Children & Families, (In re Guardianship of J.D.S.), 864 So. 2d 534, 537 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004). Thus, it appears that the majority addresses whether a "guardian" rather
than a "guardian ad litem," or perhaps also encompassing a "guardian ad litem," is proper.
166864 So. 2d at 538.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992). The Court held "that vi-
ability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally ade-
quate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions." Id. Whenever viability occurs, it
"may continue to serve as the critical fact." Id.
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but they did not necessarily have to do so. They may have done so
because the cases before the courts involved an abortion context.
Thus, although the guardianship statute was not set up as an abortion
regulation, the courts likely saw that the practical effect of allowing
fetal representation in the cases before them amounted to an abortion
regulation. This guardianship statute turned de facto "abortion regula-
tion" would have the practical effect of allowing fetal guardians to
participate in an abortion hearing regarding a woman who is incom-
petent. Thus, in this context, it was logical, and preferable, for the
courts to draw upon the Roe definition of person. Legislatures should
learn from this by understanding that any inclusion of fetus into a
guardianship or GAL statute may subsequently become an abortion
regulation, even if the intent is to provide protection for fetuses in
other contexts. As the guardianship or GAL statute would then serve
to protect fetuses, such a statute would apply to all fetuses, regardless
of the competency of the mother. To avoid this result, legislatures
should carve out an exception by stating inclusion of a fetus does not
extend to issues concerning abortion.
B. Procedural Protections
One student author has argued that even if a guardianship statute
does not cover fetuses, courts have an equitable power to appoint
guardians, especially as is necessary to protect the state's interest in
potential life. 7° He rejects the position that existing mechanisms pro-
tecting state interests are necessarily adequate for women found in-
competent, as the fundamental difference between J.D.S. and other
women is that J.D.S. does not decide for herself whether or not to
have an abortion.' 7' Therefore, this student author concludes that a
fetal guardian is minimally necessary to ensure a balanced testimony
regarding the health and life risks of the mother in cases similar to
J.D.S.172 This Note instead argues that existing mechanisms suffi-
ciently protect state interests, regardless of whether the guardian or
court ultimately makes the abortion decision.
At times, the guardian makes the abortion decision independently.
Overall, there is little law on whether a guardian for a woman with
mental retardation needs third-party consent to abortion. 73 The pau-
city of case law suggests that abortions in these situations are ob-
170 Parker, supra note 141, at 1465.
171 Id. at 1465-66.
172Id. at 1466.
173 FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 139.
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tained without court permission. 174 In the more than dozen states that
have adopted the Uniform Probate Code provisions on substituted
consent for persons found incompetent, this is most likely legal, as
there are indications that abortion is covered under the "medical
treatment" section. 1
75
In instances where the guardian makes the abortion decision, the
state's interests are still protected. The state not only has an interest in
the potential life of the fetus, but also has an interest in the mother's
well-being. 176 Both interests are protected through the initial guardi-
anship hearing, when the court appoints a guardian. In the selection of
a guardian, the court chooses a person with the woman's well-being
in mind. Furthermore, the guardian has a fiduciary duty. In choosing a
guardian, the court has not only an opportunity but rather a duty to
appoint a guardian who would, either through substitute judgment or
best interests standards, weigh the interests of both the mother and the
fetus. Since the guardian acts as a surrogate decision-maker, the
guardian has an ability to take into account the fetus's interests, as
any pregnant woman would consider fetal interests. The state's inter-
ests are protected, more so than women who do not have a guardian,
as the court may question during appointment proceedings whether
the guardian would take into account both maternal and fetal interests
in the event of pregnancy. Yet, ultimately, as with women without
guardians, the guardian, as the surrogate voice of the woman, must
make a choice between competing interests.
Critics express concern over the potential for abuse if the guardian
makes the abortion decision. They may believe that the state's interest
in ensuring that the guardian properly assesses the situation is not
adequately protected when the guardian makes the decision.177 Yet,
the court deciding the abortion question upon a guardian's petition
better addresses this concern than appointment of a fetal representa-
tive. Many states have this requirement, either amending the Uniform
Probate Code provision to specifically exclude abortion, adopting
other statutory laws requiring the guardian to seek court permission,
or requiring court consent through case law. 178
1
7 4 Id.
175 Id. at 143 (noting that the "indications" that abortion in these Uniform Probate Code ju-
risdictions are subsumed under "medical treatment" include a court decision interpreting "medi-
cal treatment" to include abortion, an absence of cases indicating judicial involvement, and the
fact that other states have expressly excluded abortion when adopting the Uniform Probate
Code).
176 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
177 Parker, supra note 141, at 1466.
178FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 1, at 143-44. Some states also explicitly prohibit a
guardian from making a decision regarding abortion but do not say who can make it; it is not
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Even in states where the court decides the abortion question, there
are mistaken assumptions that the guardian still makes the decision,
as exemplified by the J.D.S. case. One student author, in particular,
seems to suggest that the guardian for J.D.S. would ultimately make
the decision.' 79 The woman petitioning to be the fetal guardian for
J.D.S. was also concerned that J.D.S.'s guardian would make the
abortion decision. 80 These mistaken beliefs erroneously perpetuate
the idea that there is a lack of protection of state interests. Even more
so than states that allow the guardian to make the abortion decision,
states requiring court permission protect not only the state's interest
in the potential life of the fetus but also the state's interest in the
mother's health and life.
For example, in Florida, where the J.D.S. controversy occurred, a
guardian cannot consent to an abortion on behalf of the woman
without obtaining court permission. 81  Before a court grants
permission to the guardian to exercise the right to choose, the court
must appoint an attorney to represent the pregnant woman, consider
independent evidence, and find by clear and convincing evidence that
the pregnant woman cannot make the decision and that the abortion is
in her best interest. 82 This existing procedure may take fetal interests
into account. The concurring judge in the J.D.S. case also noted that
"the guardianship court has the authority and obligation to consider
the fetus's well-being, although the mother's life and health must
trump concern for the welfare of the fetus, if those interests are
irreconcilable."' 83 Thus, this procedure more than adequately protects
state interests.
C. Substantive Protections
In addition to existing court procedures, existing laws limiting
abortion protect state interests. Unfortunately, when a woman has a
disability, her disability often becomes the focus rather than her gen-
der. Thus, it becomes easy to forget that a pregnant woman who is
incompetent is first and foremost a pregnant woman. Like any preg-
nant woman, state laws limiting the availability of abortion after vi-
ability protect state interests.
clear if this is an outright ban or if someone else, such as the court, can make the decision. Id.
179 Parker, supra note 141, at 1466 (noting that "a court-appointed guardian woman is
making the decision based on a determination of J.D.S's best interests as a ward").
180Wixtrom v. Dep't of Children & Families (In re Guardianship of J.D.S.), 864 So. 2d
534, 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
181 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215(4)(e) (West 2005).
182 Id. § 744.3725.
193 864 So. 2d at 541 n.7 (Orfinger, J., concurring).
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The brief in the J.D.S. case submitted by the American Civil Lib-
erties Union (ACLU), the ACLU of Florida, the Florida National Or-
ganization for Women, and the Center for Reproductive Rights as
amicus curiae, all argued against fetal representation since existing
Florida law already protects the state's interest in the fetus.' 84 The
organizations noted that Florida law limited J.D.S., along with every
Floridian pregnant woman, from having an abortion after twenty-four
weeks unless necessary to save the life or protect the health of the
pregnant woman. 185 Other states have similar restrictions as well, al-
though states differ in the kind of restrictions necessary to protect
state interests. 86 Thus, laws limiting the availability of abortion ade-quately protect state interests without fetal representation.
D. False Conflict
Setting up a system of fetal representation improperly casts the de-
bate as a conflict between the woman and her fetus. Although not an
abortion case, one trial court appointed a fetal guardian with the abil-
ity to consent for a blood transfusion for a pregnant woman who re-
fused the blood transfusion. 87 The Appellate Court of Illinois re-
versed noting that this was not a case balancing maternal and fetal
rights. 188 The proper inquiry was how to balance the mother's right
(to refuse treatment) against the state's interest in the viable fetus. 189
The appellate court held that "[t]he asserted legal interests did not
require the public guardian's representation of the separate, putative
interests of the viable fetus."' 90 Using similar reasoning, a dissenting
judge on the Alabama Supreme Court argued that, where a lower
court appointed a fetal GAL for a pregnant minor's parental consent
by-pass hearing, such appointment "casts the inquiry as a contest be-
tween a baby struggling to save its own life and the mother fighting to
kill the baby."' 9 ' As abortion is really a conflict between a pregnant
184 Renewed Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae in Opposition to Appellant at 18-19,
Wixtrom v. Dep't of Children & Families (In re Guardianship of J.D.S.), 864 So. 2d 534 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 5D03-1921), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/
wixtromrevised.pdf [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
185 Id.
'9 See generally NARAL Pro-Choice America & NARAL Pro-Choice America Founda-
tion, Who Decides? The Status of Women's Reproductive Rights in the United States, (2005),
available at http://www.ProChoiceAmerica.org/whodecides (comparing existing state laws
restricting abortion).
187 People v. Brown (In re Brown), 689 N.E.2d 397, 400 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
188 Id. at 406.
189 Id.
190Id.
191 Ex parte Anonymous, 889 So. 2d 525, 527 (Ala. 2003) (per curiam) (Johnstone, J., dis-
senting).
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woman and the state, a guardian is not needed for the fetus, as the
fetus has no interest in the conflict. It is the state's interest in the fetus
that is at issue. Fetal representation gives the fetus a voice that may
conflict with the voice a woman who is incompetent regarding abor-
tion as either exercised directly through herself or indirectly through
her surrogate. Thus, the presence of fetal representation improperly
interjects another entity into the conflict. 192
IV. PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS
Although the current legal framework does not support fetal repre-
sentation in the abortion context for women who are incompetent,
legislatures could change the legal framework. Pro-life forces would
likely drive the change, intending to promote childbirth. Fetal repre-
sentation, however, would likely result in unintended consequences.
Already mentioned are the ethical consequences, undermining notions
of autonomy and equal treatment. Unforeseen practical consequences
include the difficulty in applying the "best interests" standard and the
ability of a fetal guardian to have a voice in other matters besides
abortion. Another consequence, perhaps foreseen by pro-life advo-
cates but not by others, is the risk of fetal representation applying to
all women.
A. The "Best Interests" Standard
Besides the fact that a fetus is not a person, and, therefore, does
not have any rights in the abortion context, even taking into account
fetal interests, how would a fetal guardian or fetal GAL determine
what is in the "best interest" of the fetus? 93 Essentially, the fetal
guardian or fetal GAL would make a decision based on his or her own
personal values. 194 Typically, fetal representatives will define the
"best interest" in terms of birth, translating into the goal of preventing
the woman from having an abortion. 95 Yet, is birth necessarily in the
fetus's best interest? What happens if the fetus is to have a short or
192 While this Note's argument that fetal representation creates a false conflict applies
equally to women who are incompetent and women who are competent, another interesting
argument is that fetal representation creates an improper conflict within a guardianship frame-
work solely for women who are incompetent. See Wieber, supra note 19, at 815-16. The adver-
sarial relationship created by fetal representation may result in the subordination of a woman's
interests with a fetus's interests, which is at odds with the guardianship notion of protecting the
woman's best interests. See id.
1
93 See Goldberg, supra note 64, at 535 (acknowledging the "difficulty of ascertaining the
'best interests' of a fetus").
194Id.
195 Silverstein, supra note 19, at 101.
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painful life? 196 What about an "altruistic" fetus that may sacrifice its
potential life for the sake of the mother's quality of life?, 97 Pro-life
advocates who support fetal guardianship should not necessarily ex-
pect that a fetal guardian would always "choose life." In the case of a
woman with mental illness who was on medication with potentially
damaging side effects to the fetus, the fetal guardian testified in favor
of abortion as in the best interests of both the fetus and the mother. 98
Another problem with a "best interests" standard is that the guard-
ian or GAL ought to take into account the person's preferences. This
is impossible with a fetus, as how can a fetus express its preferences?
One may have the same difficulty with a never competent person or
an unconscious person. Yet, to help determine best interests in these
cases, one may simply look to others stated preferences or even a per-
sonal preference, trying to decide through comparison. Yet, how can
we ask other fetuses, as they similarly cannot communicate? Also, a
representative will not remember what it was like when he or she was
a fetus. Thus, comparison will not work as a guide.
Therefore, even if society wants to prioritize fetal interests, it is
still not practical to advocate for fetal representation in the abortion
context based on the difficulty in applying a "best interests" standard.
B. Slippery Slope
Fetal representation is also not a practical policy choice because of
the slippery slope involved-if we allow fetal representation for abor-
tion decisions, why not other decisions affecting the fetus? Where do
we draw the line? The ACLU and other organizations acting as
amicus curiae in the J.D.S. case expressed concerns that the guardian
may try to influence other decisions besides abortion, potentially
negatively impacting the woman's health as well. 199 This brief noted
that the appellant's brief stated that the fetal guardian may face issues
such as "whether to obtain a sonogram, use of anesthesia for any
medical procedure, the type of vitamins, choice of delivery, medica-
tions, and other pre-natal 'dilemmas. ' '' 200 The slippery slope extends
to a parade of horribles; a woman may also find herself facing fetal
representation if she "smoked, ate 'junk food,' failed to seek prenatal
care, engaged in strenuous exercise, worked in a hazardous environ-
196 Goldberg, supra note 64, at 536.
197 Id. at 536-37.
98 Lefebvre v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 566 So. 2d 568, 569-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
199ACLU Brief, supra note 184, at 16.
200Id.
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ment, engaged in sexual activity when contraindicated, breathed pol-
luted air, or lived near electric force fields or toxic waste sites."' 0°
It is not only a question of where to draw the line, but to whom to
draw the line. Even if one rejects this Note's ethical and doctrinal ar-
guments and accepts the concept of fetal representation for women
who are incompetent, does one necessarily want to extend this ap-
proach to all women? Current reality is that all women are not yet
targeted by proponents of fetal representation. Fetal representation is
entwined with the pro-life movement. Historically, those supportive
of limiting abortion have had the most success by targeting "the least
powerful categories of pregnant females-poor women and unmar-
ried minors.' '2°2 Now, supporters of limiting abortion have targeted
another vulnerable group--women who are incompetent, often with
mental retardation. By targeting vulnerable populations, the pro-life
movement can introduce the concept, create legal precedent, and then
extend the concept to more women. This is essentially a "divide and
conquer" tactic; fetal representation is targeted to both minors and
women who are incompetent. Eventually, fetal representation could
extend to all women.
V. CONCLUSION
Many people, with either pro-life or pro-choice views, may con-
sider fetal representation for all pregnant women a distant, unlikely
occurrence. This Note doubts that fetal representation currently com-
prises a serious threat to all pregnant women. It is precisely because
fetal representation does not threaten all pregnant women that fetal
representation for women who are incompetent is particularly morally
problematic. Legislatures and courts must remain consistent in pre-
serving the right (including the "right") to choose for all women. Fe-
tal representation, therefore, is not only an abortion issue but also an
autonomy and equal treatment issue. Yes, women who are incompe-
tent are different from women who are competent in terms of compe-
tency. Once the court appoints a guardian to act as a surrogate voice,
the difference, however, theoretically disappears. Therefore, the
guardian should have the ability to exercise the right to choose on
behalf of the woman in as similar a way possible as a competent
woman. To guard against guardian abuse, states may impose some
constraints on a guardian's exercise of rights. For example, legisla-
201 Goldberg, supra note 64, at 537.
202 Katheryn D. Katz, The Pregnant Child's Right to Self-Determination, 62 ALB. L. REV.
1119,1120(1999).
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tures may require court oversight of a guardian's decision. Fetal rep-
resentation, however, guards the fetus, not the guardian.
Guardianship statutes are in place to protect the interests of a per-
son who is incompetent. Currently, guardianship statutes do not ex-
tend protection to fetuses. States, however, already have existing
mechanisms to protect their interest in the potential life of the fetus.
Guardians or courts making the abortion decision can take fetal inter-
ests into account, as a competent woman can also take fetal interests
into account. Existing substantive laws limit the availability of abor-
tion to all women, including women who are incompetent. This exist-
ing framework protecting state interests correctly ensures that the
conflict remains between the woman and the state rather than the
woman and her fetus.
If legislatures include protection of fetuses in guardianship stat-
utes, a host of unintended practical problems may arise. How would
the "best interests" standard apply to a fetus? Also, fetal guardians
may then not limit decisions solely to abortion but pervade other deci-
sions made during pregnancy. Furthermore, all women may eventu-
ally face fetal representatives before accessing an abortion.
In order to truly protect interests of women who are incompetent,
including those with mental retardation, efforts should focus on en-
suring access to quality guardians who will act as a surrogate voice
rather than providing a fetal guardian or fetal GAL who will act as a
fetal voice. Women who are incompetent, like J.D.S., already have a
difficult time getting their voices heard. Providing a voice to the fetus
acts to silence, rather than strengthen, a voicing of a "right" to choose
by women who are incompetent.
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